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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary
The issues in this case primarily concern a settlement agreement (hereinafter "Memorandum

of Understanding" or "MOU"); the rights and obligations of the parties thereunder; and the findings
of the district court under various summary judgment rulings and as a result of trial during the course
of a six-year proceeding.
In 1995, the parties agreed to participate in a joint venture. In connection with their joint
venture activities, the joint venture partners formed two corporations, one of which took out
substantial loans from the Bank of Eastern Idaho (now Bank of Idaho) and the Eastern Idaho
Economic Development Council ("EIEDC").

When difficulties arose with the joint venture

business, the parties agreed to end their association. The terms of that separation were set forth in
the MOU, under which Appellants purchased the Respondents' interest in the joint venture business.
After executing the MOU, Appellants interfered with and manipulated the business operations of the
joint venture business in order to prevent Respondents from receiving purchase consideration under
the MOU. This litigation included multiple summary judgment rulings, and a three-day trial.
Appellants raise thirteen issues on appeal, many of which were never presented to the district court
during the six-year course of this litigation, and for which there is no ruling in the record.

B.

Factual Background
The Parties - Appellant Jan Vreeken ("Vreeken") is a citizen of The Netherlands. Appellant

Gerbroeders Meijer Belegging, B.V. ("Gerbroeders") is a foreign co,yoration organized in The
Netherlands.

Gerbroeders is apparently owned by Vreeken and is the parent corporation of

Appellants' Lockwood Engineering B.V. ("LEBV"), a foreign corporation organized in The
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Netherlands; Lockwood Packaging Corporation ("LPC"), a Delaware corporation; and Lockwood
Packaging Corporation Idaho ("LPCI"), an Idaho corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of
LPC. (R. Vol. III, p. 427; Vol. I, p. 53-54). LEBV, LPC and LPCI are sometimes referred to as the
"Lockwood Entities." Vreeken, at all times relevant hereto, was the chief executive officer, director
and sole beneficial owner of Gerbroeders and the Lockwood Entities. (R. Vol. III, p. 427).
Christianne Vreeken ("Christianne") is the daughter of Vreeken and the successor in interest
of the Bank of Idaho, the original plaintiff in this case. (R. Vol. I, p. 118; Vol. VI, p. 1289-90).
Neither Christianne nor the Bank of Idaho is a party to this appeal.
Respondent Thomas R. Gold ("T. Gold") is a Massachusetts resident and former officer of
LPCI. Respondent Richard L. Gold ("R. Gold") is a Massachusetts resident. Respondent Tomac
Packaging, Inc. ("Tomac") is a Massachusetts corporation. (R. Vol. 1, p. 53). All three Respondents
are hereinafter referred to as "the Golds."
The Joint Venture- Vreeken, through LEBV, and the Golds commenced a joint venture in
1995, initially selling produce packaging machinery and equipment in the United States, Canada and
Mexico. The parties entered into a Joint Venture Agreement to memorialize their business venture
(R. Vol. V, p. 883-92). In furtherance of the joint venture business contemplated by the parties, LPC
was formed and (contrary to Appellants' erroneous assertion in their brief) was initially owned 50%
by LEBV and 50% by Tomac. The business operations ofTomac were eventually taken over by
LPC and in connection therewith the 50% ownership interest held by Tomac in LPC was transferred
to T. Gold. (R. Vol. V. p. 875 and 894-97).
The equipment was to be sold by LEBV (the manufacturer) to LPC as a jointly owned and/or
controlled master distributor in the United States for further distribution to distributors and end users.
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(R. Vol. I, p. 54-55; R. Vol. V, p. 874-75). LPCI, based in Idaho Falls, was formed in 1997 in order
to manufacture bags and sell other packaging materials, and to act as the distributor of the LEBV
equipment in the Northwest United States. (R. Vol. V, p. 875; Vol. VI, p. 1290).
Loans/Personal Guarantees - In! 997, LPCI entered into loan transactions with the Bank of
Idaho in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Prior to the split of the parties and their entry into the MOU, Vreeken,
T. Gold and the other Lockwood Entities, through a succession of guarantee agreements, became
jointly and severally liable for LPCI's obligations to Bank ofidaho. (R. Vol. I, p. 21-40). At the time
the instant lawsuit commenced, LPCI had defaulted under its agreements with Bank of Idaho.
Principal and interest owing under the Bank ofidaho loan totaled $619,937.11. (R. Vol. I, p. 24).
During the course of business operations, LPCI also obtained a loan from EIEDC. The
obligation to repay such loan was jointly and severally guaranteed by T. Gold, Vreeken, LPC, LPCI
and LEBV. EIEDC obtained a total judgment in the amountof$253,331.95 on its loan against LPC,
LPCI, LEBV, T. Gold and Vreeken. (Trial. Ex. 7, p. 2). R. Gold purchased the interest ofEIEDC
under the loan, including all rights to collect under relevant guarantees on February 19, 2004. (R.
Vol. V, p. 873 and 949-55; Trial Ex. 14).
Prior to the formation of the parties' joint venture, Tomac had entered into a loan transaction
with Citizens Bank ofMassachusetts. R. Gold personally guaranteed Tomac' s obligations under this
loan and pledged certain marketable securities as collateral. (R. Vol. V, p. 959).
Problems with the Business -

From and after February 28, 1997, both LPC and LPCI

experienced numerous financial accounting problems, including, but not limited to, problems
reconciling balance sheets and income statements, problems tracking inventory receipts and sales,
and problems verifying accuracy of accounts receivable. (R. Vol. IV, p. 843-72; R. Vol. V, p. 875).
3

In March 1998, Vreeken and Jan Postema visited the LPC offices in Woburn, Massachusetts.
Jan Postema at the time was the Treasurer of LPC and also the Chief Financial Officer of LEBV.
During such visit, Vreeken and Jan Postema were given access to all of the business records ofLPC
and LPCI located in the Woburn offices. (R. Vol. V, p. 875-76).
In August 1999, Jerry Ceuppens and Jack Schipper visited the Woburn office and were given
access to all of the financial records located in the Woburn office ofLPC and LPCI. At such time,
Jack Schipper was the Assistant Controller ofLEBV and Jerry Ceuppens was a Vice President of
LEBV, and in charge of all North American activities for LEBV. At the time of such visit, John Teti
was the Controller for LPC and LPCI. John Teti provided to T. Gold a Memo dated February 7,
2000, wherein Mr. Teti advised T. Gold in detail of the records reviewed by Jerry Ceuppens and Jack
Schipper. (R. Vol. V, p. 876, 898). On August 10, 1999, Jerry Ceuppens and Jack Schipper
provided to T. Gold and Vreeken a "Management Letter," which set forth the findings and
conclusions arrived at by Jerry Ceuppens and Jack Schipper after their visit to the Woburn office
pertaining to the accounting, sales, administration, administrative organization and management of
LPC. (R. Vol. V, p. 876, 899-904).
In the fall of 1999, T. Gold and Vreeken began to negotiate the sale ofT. Gold's interest in
LPC and LPCI to Vreeken. On November 12, 1999, Vreeken provided to T. Gold a letter wherein
Vreeken demonstrated that he was fully aware of the financial accounting problems experienced by
LPC and LPCI. (R. Vol. V, p. 876-77, 905-08). On December 11, 1999, T. Gold provided to
Vreeken a "buy out proposal." In paragraph 6 of the proposal, T. Gold stated the following:
The deal is AS IS WHERE IS. I am not going to make any financial or other
representations about the business, or allow any other basis for anyone to come back
against me when it comes time to pay the purchase price. In other words, this must
be a clean deal if your desire is to pay me out over time. (R. Vol. V, p. 877, 909-11 ).
4

Vreeken testified that the Golds did not provide any promises, representations, warranties or
covenants except those set forth in the MOU and Appellants were not relying on any representations,
warranties and/or statements in connection with executing the MOU. (R. Vol. IV, p. 826-34).
Memorandum of Understanding

By the end of 1999, the relationships between the joint

venture parties had broken down and on May 12, 2000, the parties entered into the MOU. The MOU
was executed by the Golds and Vreeken, in which control of LPC and LPCI was transferred to
Vreeken. 1
In consideration of the Golds' transfer of their interests in LPC and LPCI to Vreeken and the
Lockwood Entities, Vreeken, LPC and LPCI agreed to do the following:
1.

LPC and LPCI were to use best efforts to obtain the release of the Golds from their

various personal guarantees of the Bank ofidaho, EIEDC and Citizens Bank loans. If necessary to
effect such releases, Vreeken agreed to personally guarantee the applicable loans. (Trial Ex. 6).
2.

Pursuant to paragraph 2a. of the MOU, LPC and LPCI agreed to pay to R. Gold

$100,000.00 and to T. Gold $450,000.00 under various so-called "Payout Notes." The MOU
specifically set forth the payment terms for the Payout Notes. The amount due on the Payout Notes
was to be accelerated and become fully due and payable after non-payment of the amounts when due
and receipt of a ten day default letter. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 3-4). The Payout Notes were not paid at the
scheduled time and default letters were sent on November 16, 2000, December 21, 2000 and
February 12, 2001. (R. Vol. 5., p. 877).

1

The MOU was to be a preliminary document to be integrated into so-called definitive
documents. However, in the absence of definitive documents, the MOU specifically provides that it is
the binding and final agreement of the parties relating to the breakup of the joint venture. No definitive
documents were ever signed, and all parties acknowledged that the MOU constitutes the final expression
of their understanding. (R. Vol. I, p. 55; R. Vol. ID, p. 428-29).
5

The MOU further provided in paragraph 2a. that the Payout Notes were to be secured by the
assets of LPC and LPCI, with such security interest being subordinate to all current bank loans, all
security positions on record at the time of the MOU, and any future refinancing of such bank loans.
(Trial Ex. 6, p. 3-4). The security interest granted to T. Gold and R. Gold pursuant to such provision
of the MOU was perfected pursuant to the filing of the financing statements. (Trial Ex. 8 and 9).
The MOU also provided that there were to be full mutual releases of the respective parties, except
for matters arising out of performance of the MOU, and for fraud. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 3 and 5). In
addition, the MOU provided that there were no representations or warranties, except as specifically
provided in the MOU. No financial representations or warranties regarding LPC or LPCI were made
by Respondents in the MOU. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 8).
UCC Filings -In violation of the MOU, LEBV and Gerbroeders filed financing statements
in Idaho and other jurisdictions purporting to evidence a security interest in the assets of LPC and
LPCI which were superior in priority to those ofT. Gold and R. Gold. (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B). No
documents exist granting any security interest to LEBV and/or Gerbroeders in the assets of LPCI.
No documents exist granting any security interest to Gerbroeders in the assets ofLPC (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 9-12). 2 Tluough these improper filings, Vreeken intentionally attempted to interfere with the
ability of the Golds to access their collateral under the MOU, and to enforce their claims against the
Lockwood Entities to make payments on the Payout Notes. All of the improper UCC-1 Financial
Statements were signed by Vreeken. (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B; Tr. Vol. III, p. 52-55).

2

Respondents refer to the trial transcript which is in three volumes as follows: Volume I - April
2-3, 2007 (April 3, 2007, testimony begins on p. 122); Volume II - April 4, 2007 (morning session); and
Volume III-April 4, 2007 (afternoon session).
6

Bank ofidaho Assignment to Christianne - Sometime prior to October 12, 2001, the Bank
ofidaho agreed to accept $617,870.59 as full satisfaction of the LPCI indebtedness. On October 12,
2001, LPCI agent and representative William Wendels paid $200,000 to the Bank ofidaho with a

Bank of Commerce check (No. 160346), and on October 15, 2001, the balance of the funds due to
Bank of Idaho were paid, in the amount of $417,870.59. That same day, Christianne and the Bank
ofidaho executed an Assignment. (R. Vol. III, p. 504-19). The Assignment states that the Bank of
Idaho assigned to Christianne its rights under the LPCI loan dated November 18, 1999, including
the right to enforce the loan against the guarantors; and that the Bank of Idaho also assigned its
security interests in the LPCI assets. (R. Vol. III, p. 504-05). Vreeken provided the funds
Christianne used to acquire the Assignment from the Bank ofldaho. (R. Vol. III, p. 498-99).
Transfer to Telford - Vreeken, despite the provisions of the MOU, transferred, or caused
LPCI to transfer, or acquiesced in the transfer of substantially all ofits assets to Telford Corporation,
("Telford"), a corporation controlled and operated by Christianne, thereby hampering the ability of
LPCI to make payment on the Payout Notes, and completely impairing the collateral of the Golds
under the MOU. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21-26; Tr. Vol. I, p. 34-40, 99-120).
Status ofLPCI During the Course of Litigation-During the course of this litigation, LPCI
went from an active corporation with millions of dollars in sales and assets to, at the time of trial,
a defunct corporation with virtually no assets of value. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 27-35).

C.

Procedural History

The action commenced on April 27, 2001, when the Bank of Idaho filed its verified
Complaint against LEBV, Gerbroeders, Vreeken and T. Gold, the guarantors of the LPCI-Bank of
Idaho Loan, to enforce and satisfy the Bank ofldaho loan. (R. Vol. I, p. 21-40). On June 26, 2001,
7

T. Gold filed a verified Answer, Cross-claim and Third-Party Complaint. R. Gold and Tomac also

joined as Third-Party Plaintiffs. LPC and LPCI were named as Third-Party Defendants. (R. Vol.
. I, p. 41-79). On November 2, 2001, LPC and LPCI filed an Answer to the Bank of Idaho's
Complaint and LPC cross-claimed against the Golds. (R. Vol. I, p. 101-08).
As a result of the assigmnent, Cluistianne was substituted as Plaintiff for the Bank ofldaho.
T. Gold and R. Gold filed an Amended Cross-claim and Third-Party Complaint for Claim and
Delivery on October 11, 2002. (R. Vol. I, p. 188-228; R. Vol. III, p. 504). LEBV, Gerbroeders, LPC,
LPCI and Vreeken filed their Answer and Counterclaim to Third-Party Complaint and Cross-Claim
on July 9, 2003. (R. Vol. III, p. 426-34).
On December 1, 2004, the district court issued an Opinion, Decision, and Order dismissing
with prejudice Cluistianne' s Complaint (as successor to Bank ofidaho) against all named defendants
as a sanction for repeatedly failing to appear at her deposition. (R. Vol. IV, p. 761-69). Any and all
obligations that were the subject ofCluistianne's Complaint were deemed fully satisfied and paid
in full. (R. Vol. IV, p. 769). This judgment is now final and unappealable because of Cluistianne's
failure to timely submit an appeal to this Court.
The Golds filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 14, 2005, seeking dismissal
with prejudice of all claims brought against them, a declaratory judgment regarding the performance
of, and amount due under, the MOU, entry of a money judgment against Lockwood, LPC, and LPCI,
and a writ of possession allowing the Golds to obtain possession of the assets ofLPC and LPCI in
order to foreclose the security interest held by the Golds in those assets. (R. Vol. IV, p. 812-19).
The district court issued its Opinion, Decision and Order on T. Gold, R. Gold and Tomac's Motion
for Summary Judgment on May 3, 2005. (R. Vol. V, p. 1082-1106).
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In its Opinion, the district court dismissed Vreeken and the Lockwood Entities' claims for
misrepresentation and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The remainder
of claims brought by Vreeken and the Lockwood Entities were dismissed pursuant to section 2.h.
of the MOU. Concerning the Golds' claims, the court found l) that the Lockwood Entities were (a)
in default under section 2.a. of the MOU, (b) liable on the Payout Note to R. Gold in the principal
amount of$100,000.00 plus interest, and (c) liable on the Payout Note to T. Gold in the principal
amount of$450,000.00 plus interest. The court further found that such obligations were secured by
the assets of the Lockwood Entities. The court further found that LPC and LPCI were required to
make annual payments to T. Gold in the amount equal to 25% of their respective net profits until the
aggregate amount of such payments reaches $100,000.00. (R. Vol. V, p. 1104-05).
On September 2, 2005, the district court issued its Opinion, Decision, and Order on the
parties' Motions for Reconsideration. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1121-36). In its Opinion, the district court
explained that, pursuant to MOU paragraph 2.c., any damages incurred by the Golds as a result of
the failure of Vreeken, LEBV, LPC, and LPCI to obtain the releases of the loans specified therein
are secured by the assets ofLPC and LPCI. (R. Vol. VI., p. 434). The district court also ordered
Vreeken to effectuate a personal guarantee on the Citizens Bank Loan referred to in the MOU. (R.
Vol. V., p. 1134).
On August 21, 2006, the Golds filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming that
Vreeken was personally liable on the Payout Notes. (R. Vol. V, p. 1164-68). The Golds additionally
filed a separate Motion for Entry of Summary Judgment, asking the district court to enter summary
judgment pursuant to the court's prior opinions on the Golds' first Motion for Summary Judgment
and Motions for Reconsideration. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1169-76). The court entered Summary Judgment
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pursuant to its prior opinion on October 20, 2006. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1194-98). On November 8, 2006,
the district court granted in part and denied in part the Golds' second Motion for Summary
Judgment, finding among other things 1) that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether
or not Vreeken intentionally interfered with the obligations of LPC and LPCI under the MOU by
filing UCC liens, 2) that the Golds had failed to show sufficient evidence to find Vreeken personally
liable on the Payout Notes, 3) that Vreeken was obligated to indemnify the Golds on the Citizens
Bank and EIEDC loans. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1199-1235).
The issues not resolved by the prior summary judgments were tried before the Honorable Jon
J. Shindurling from April 2, 2007 to April 4, 2007. The district court issued its Opinion, Decision,
and Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 25, 2007. (R. Vol. VI, p. 12881311 ). The district court found Vreeken personally liable as a result of his wrongful conduct. The
district court also entered additional findings of fact and law related to the foregoing and in support
of its summary judgment findings. Judgment was filed October 5, 2007. (R. Vol VII, p. 1462-68).
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on October 31, 2007. (R. Vol. VII, p. 1470).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The Golds disagree with Appellants' characterization of the issues on appeal as follows:
(a)

Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Appellants' cross-claims
when Appellants did not establish evidence of essential elements of their claims and the
claims were barred by the MOU?

(b)

Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Appellants' breach of the
MOU when it relied on uncontroverted evidence?
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(c)

Whether the district court correctly detem1ined that Vreeken is obligated to indemnify the
Golds on the Citizens Bank and EIEDC loans based on the language and intent of the MOU?

(d)

Whether the district court erred in failing to find Respondents breached fiduciary duties when
Appellants did not plead such claim, Appellants never obtained a ruling from the court to
conform the pleadings to any purported evidence on such claim, Respondents objected to
evidence allegedly related to such claim, and the MOU barred the claim?

(e)

Whether the district court erred in failing to have Vreeken subpoenaed in his native language
when Appellants never raised the issue before the district court, never asserted the
affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process, and waived any alleged defense
based on personal jurisdiction?

(f)

Whether the district court erred in failing to provide Vreeken a Dutch interpreter during his
deposition when he was represented by competent counsel who never requested an
interpreter, failed to object when his deposition was used in the summary judgment motions,
and demonstrated his ability to communicate well in English?

(g)

Whether the district court correctly determined that Vreeken engaged in wrongful conduct
based on tile substantial, competent evidence of wrongful acts?

(h)

Whether the district court erred in regard to its findings pertaining to the assignment from
Bank ofidaho to Christianne?

(i)

Whether the district court properly admitted evidence of statements made by Christianne
when the evidence showed she was Vreeken's agent, was unavailable for trial and made
statements against her interests, and when the court's findings were supported by other
substantial, competent evidence?
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G)

Whether the district court correctly refused to admit certain documentary evidence and to
allow the testimony of Jack Schipper when Appellants failed to disclose the documentary
evidence and Appellants never requested Mr. Schipper as a witness?

(k)

Whether the district court properly determined that certain assets were owned by LPCI as
capital contributions from Vreeken when the court relied on substantial, competent evidence?

(I)

Whether Respondents are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees?

III. ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
The Golds respectfully request an award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-123. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12120(3), an award of attorneys fees and costs is appropriate to the prevailing party in an action
involving a commercial transaction. The Golds do not dispute Appellants' contention that the
transactions at issue are commercial business transactions. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 33).
Further, many of Appellants' issues were never presented to the district court and are unsupported
by the record, entitling Respondents to fees for frivolous claims pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-123.

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
With regard to the claims that were dismissed on summary judgment, "this Court's standard
of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion."

Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 395, 162 P.3d 772, 774-75 (2007). Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the Affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "The party seeking summary judgment faces the
burden of proving the absence of material facts, but if' a party moves for summary judgment on the
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basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the non-moving
party's case, the non-moving party must establish the existence of an issue of fact regarding that
element."' BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007) (quoting
Farm Credit Bank ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 125 lda.½o 270, 273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994)).

"When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, resolution of the possible
conflict between inferences is within the responsibilities of the trial court as fact finder. The trial
judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment, but rather the judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidentiary facts, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." Chapin, 144
Idaho at 396, 162 P.3d at 775 (citing Intermountain Forest Management v. Louisiana Pac. Corp.,
136 Idaho 233,235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001)).
Factual determinations by the court in the trial of this matter are reviewed under a clear error
standard. See l.R.C.P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.").
"To decide whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this court must determine whether the
findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Evidence is substantial and competent
if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. Findings based on substantial, competent
evidence, even if conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal." Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322,
325, 78 P.3d 389, 392 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
"When an action is tried to a court without a jury, determinations as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, its probative effect and inferences and conclusions
to be drawn there from, are all matters within the province of the trial court. The trial court's findings
of fact will be liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered." Estate of Skvorak v. Security
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Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 19, 89 P.3d 856, 859 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Any
conclusions oflaw are reviewed by this Court de nova. Lovitt, 139 Idaho at 325, 78 P.3d at 392.
V. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on Appellants' CrossClaims.

1.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Appellants' Fraud/Misrepresentation Claim
Because There Was Np P:r:;_;;' vi' ivi1srepre~d1tatiun andh"lr T11dif1:1hlP Rdiance.
Gorrectly granted summary judgment on Appellants' claim of

fr:,· .1/misrepresentation because they tailed

,0 carry their burden of proof to establish the required

elements for fraud/misrepresentation. In support of t1,2;r first motion for sum,:,ary judgment, the
Golds produced substantial evidence by way of affidavits which established that Vreeken could not
demonstrate misrepresentations by T. Gold or justifiable reliance on any alleged misrepresentations,
both of which are required elements of their claim. (R. Vol. IV, p. 820-72; Vol. V, p. 873,956, 9571030). As a result, the burden shifted to Appellants to establish the existence of both elements. See
BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399,402 (2007).
Appellants have not contested the legal standard applicable to their claim of
fraud/misrepresentation. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 11 ). 3 A claim for material/misrepresentation
under Massachusetts law (which the parties agree governs the substantive elements of this case
relating to the MOU) requires the following:
To establish a claim of material misrepresentation the plaintiff must show that the
defendant made a false statement of material fact to the plaintiff, concerning a fact
that a reasonable person would consider important in making the decision the

3

Pursuant to the MOU, the law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts applied. (Trial Ex. 6, p.
8). Neither party has contested the application of Massachusetts Law to this claim.
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plaintiff was about to make, and that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's statement
to his detriment. Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 77-78 (1992).
Porcaro v. Chen, 2004 WL 3091558, *4 (Mass. Super. 2004). With regard to demonstrating

justifiable reliance, Massachusetts law requires the following:
[I]n Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 374, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1955), [the Supreme
Judicial Court] adopted the rule of the Restatement o/Torts sec. 540 (1938), which
states: "The recipient in a business transaction of a fraudulent misrepresentation of
fact is justified in relying on its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity
of the representation had he made a.'1 investigation.... " The Restatement (Second) of
Torts sec. 540 states: "The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is
justified in relying upon its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity of
the representation had he made an investigation." Restatement (Second) ofTorts sec.
541 states: "The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justified in relying
upon its truth ifhe knows that it is false or its falsity is obvious to him." There is thus
a distinction between a falsity that could only be uncovered by way of"investigation"
and a falsity that was readily apparent or "obvious." Comment a to Restatement
(Second) of Torts sec. 540, supra, states that, "if a mere cursory glance would have
disclosed the falsity of the representation, its falsity is regarded as obvious under the
rule stated in sec. 541."
Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, 2004 WL 3019442, *19 (Mass. Super. 2004).

In their brief, Appellants summarily claim that the record supports that both written and oral
misrepresentations were made to Vreeken upon which Appellants relied to their detriment.
(Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 12). The record cited by Appellants are portions of deposition
transcripts and affidavits submitted by Golds in support of their various Motions for Summary
Judgment. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 12). The po1iions of the record cited by Appellants are
not relevant to the issue of alleged misrepresentations. For example, Appellants cite Volume III, p.
497-509 and p. 564-566. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 12). The bulk of this deposition testimony
concerns Vreeken's transfer of money to his daughter, Christianne, to purchase the Bank ofidaho
debt. The only portion ofVreeken's testimony which relates to representations made to Vreeken
15

supports the district court's decision. (R. Vol. III, p. 497). 4 Appellants claim the record supports
their position, but fail to identify any alleged misrepresentations in the record.
Further, Appellants boldly assert in their Brief that "the deposition excerpts of Melanie
Harris, Lorna Schubert, John Teti, and Hans Van der Sande all demonstrate the confusion and
uncertainly relating to the Golds' management of LPI and its financial status."
Appellants' Brief, p. 12).

(Amended

Not a single citation to the record follows Appellants' assertion.

Appellants have identified no evidence which supports their claims that any misrepresentation was
made and/or that Vreeken had a right to rely on any alleged misrepresentation.
Based on the overwhelming evidence before it, the district court found that Vreeken could
not have relied on alleged misrepresentations. First, Vreeken testified in his deposition that he did
not rely on any written information, but only the oral discussions with T. Gold. (R. Vol. V, p. 109091; R. Vol. IV, p. 826-27).

During his deposition, Vreeken could not identify the alleged

misrepresentations by T. Gold. (R. Vol. IV, p. 826-28). As a result ofVreeken's admissions, the
district court limited its analysis to the oral representations alleged by Vreeken later in his
memorandum in opposition. (R. Vol. V, p. 1092). The district court failed to find that Vreeken
justifiably relied on any statement from T. Gold because the evidence demonstrated that Vreeken

4

The exchange Appellants claim supports alleged misrepresentations is as follows:

Q. And so between the two of you, you reviewed whatever information you had and
decided to execute the agreement; is that correct?

A. That's correct.
Q. Were you relying on information supplied to you from anyone else within your

companies?
A.No.
(R. Vol. III, p. 497).
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knew the financial and administrative status of LPC and LPCI and did not trust T. Gold or his

valuation of the business. (R. Vol. V, p. 1092-95). As detailed in the facts, Vreeken or his agents
visited LPC' s offices on multiple occasions and were given access to all business records. (R. Vol.
V, p. 875-76, 898). As a result of those visits, a detailed "Management Letter" was prepared,
describing the significant management and accounting issues. (R. Vol. V, p. 876, 899-904).
Vreeken acknowledged that he was aware of the problems. (R. Vol. V, p. 876-77).
On December 11, 1999, T. Gold provided to Vreeken a "buy out proposal," stating the
following:
The deal is AS IS WHERE IS. I am not going to make any financial or other
representations about the business, or allow any other basis for anyone to come back
against me when it comes time to pay the purchase price. In other words, this must
be a clean deal if your desire is to pay me out over time.
(R. Vol. V, p. 877, 909-11). Further, the MOU specifically excluded any financial representations
and warranties in its integration clause at paragraph 6, which reads as follows:
[T]his Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties with respect to the
subject matter hereof and supercedes all prior agreements, understandings and
negotiations of the parties with respect thereto. Except as expressly stated or referred
to herein, there are no other restrictions, promises, representations, warranties,
covenants or undertakings in connection herewith. (emphasis added)
(R. Vol. V, p. 877, 912-22). Vreeken also admitted that the Golds did not provide any promises,
representations, warranties, covenants or undertakings except those set forth in the MOU and
Appellants were not relying on any representations, warranties and/or statements in connection with
their execution of the tv10U. (R. "Vol. IV, p. 826-34). Appellar1ts provided no evidence of

misrepresentations or justifiable reliance. Based on the overwhelming evidence before it, and
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Appellants' failure to carry their burden, the district court correctly dismissed Appellants' claim for
fraud/misrepresentation.
2.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Appellants' Claim for Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Because the Alleged Conduct Occurred
Prior to the Execution of the MOU.

Appellants have offered no argument in support of their allegation that the district court erred
in dismissing their claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In

Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 443 Mass. 367, 371, 2005 WL 289185, *4 (2005), the
Massachusetts Court set forth the requirements of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing:
Every contract in Massachusetts is subject, to some extent, to an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411
Mass.451, 473, 583 N.E.2d 806 (I 991 ). This implied covenant may not be "invoked
to create rights and duties not otherwise provided for in the existing contractual
relationship," Uno Restaurants, Inc. v. Boston Kenmore Realty Corpi41 Mass. 376,
385, 805 N.E.2d 957 (2004), but rather concerns the manner of performance. It has
been explained that the implied covenant exists so that the objectives of the contract
may be realized. See Crellin Technologies, Inc. v. Equipment/ease Corp., 18 F.3d 1,
10 (1st Cir.1994). The concept of good faith and fair dealing in any one context is
shaped by the nature of the contractual relationship from which the implied covenant
derives. The scope of the covenant is only as broad as the contract that governs the
particular relationship.
Based on this undisputed law, the district court correctly dismissed the claims because Appellants'
alleged evidence occurred prior to the MOU. Paragraph 2.h. of the MOU states as follows:
The Lockwood Entities and Vreeken agree to sign a release effectively releasing [T.
Gold] and [R. Gold] from any and all claims they may have against them, with the
exception of claims grounded in fraud or related to this Agreement, including any
further obligations under that certain Joint Venture Agreement dated October 30,
1995.
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Appellants produced no evidence that the Golds interfered with or injured Appellants' rights
pursuant to the MOU after its execution. (R. Vol. V, p. 1096). Consequently, the district court
correctly dismissed Appellants' claim.
B.

The District Court Correctly Determined That Appellants Breached the MOU Because
They Failed to Contest the Motion and the District Court's Decision Was Based on
Uncontroverted Evidence.
Appellants admit they failed to contest the Golds' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding

the breach of the MOU, but claim that the district court should have "searched" the record on their
behalf and found facts to defeat the Motion. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 13-14; R. Vol. V, p.
1097). The responding party and not the district court carries the burden to respond with evidence
illustrating a genuine issue of material fact:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the
party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against the party.
I.R.C.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). In a recent case, this Court rejected a similar argument from a party
who failed to respond to a summary judgment motion. See Esser v. Lost River Ballistics Tech., Inc.,
_Idaho_, _P.3d_, 2008 WL 2052338 (May 15, 2008) (subject to revision or withdrawal). In

Esser, the plaintiff failed to respond to the summary judgment with affidavits or otherwise. See id.
at *I. Further, plaintiff failed to direct the trial court to facts asserted in the verified complaint,

\vhich plaintiff later asserted created genuine issues of material fact. See id. at *5. On appeal,
plaintiff claimed the district court improperly granted summary judgment. This Court affirmed the
district court's decision, and stated:

19

[T]he trial court is not required to search the record looking for evidence that may
create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing the sununary judgment is
required to bring that evidence to the court's attention. Where Esser Electric's
counsel did not argue to the district court that the verified complaint should be
considered as a sworn statement in opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
we will not consider on appeal whether the district court erred in failing to do so.
Esser, 2008 WL 2052338 at *5-6. As in Esser, the district court was not required to scour the

record for facts to oppose the motion.
Appellants now claim on appeal that the Golds' evidence of business expenses and charges
contained "inconsistencies," "unexplained expenses," and "unrelated charges." (Amended
Appellants' Brief, p. 14). Although the Golds disagree with the allegations, Appellants are several
years too late with their objections. They had an opportunity to respond and did nothing. That error
is their own and not the district court's.
Appellants also incorrectly argue that any inferences, assuming that any existed, should have
been resolved in their favor. Again, this argument has been rejected by this Court and misstates the
standard of review. See Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 337-38, 689 P.2d
227, 229-30 (Ct. App. 1984). In Verb illis, the party opposing sununary judgment attempted the very
same argument. The Idaho Court of Appeals, addressing this Court's prior rulings on the issue,
responded as follows:
The [defendantJ also contends that the consumers were not entitled to the inference
of a defect because, in a sununary judgment proceeding, all inferences must be drawn
in favor of the nonmoving party. This contention fails upon two grounds. First, an
inference adverse to the norunoving party may be drawn if it is the only reasonable
inference. Here, disregarding a.riy hypothecated fact and focusing upon facts set forth
in the record, we find no basis for any reasonable inference except that the
compressor was defective. Secondly, in Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103
Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 657,661 (1982), our Supreme Court held if"evidentiary
facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact,
summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences,
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because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those
inferences." A jury trial was not requested in this case. The (defendant] did not
controvert the evidentiary facts advanced by the [plaintiffs]. Therefore, the magistrate
was not constrained to draw all inferences in favor of the [defendant]. He could, and
did, draw his own reasonable inference from the undisputed facts before him.

Verb ill is, I 07 Idaho at 337-38, 689 P.2d at 229-30 (internal citations omitted). Likewise, the district
court, as the trier of fact, was able to draw reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts before
it. The district court correctly granted the Golds' Judgment on the breach of the MOU.

C.

The District Court Correctly Determined That Appellant Vreeken is Obligated to
Indemnify R. Gold on the Citizens Bank Loan and T. Gold on the EIEDC Loan
Because the Language and Intent of the MOU Requires it.
Appellants' argument that the MOU does not require Vreeken to indemnify the Golds ignores

the law and the clear language and intent of the MOU. For contract interpretation issues, this Court
applies the following standard of review:
The existence of ambiguity deterh1ines the standard of review of a lower court's
interpretation of a contract or instrument. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ethington Family
Trust, 137 Idaho 435, 437-38, 50 P.3d 450, 452-53 (2002). "The initial inquiry into
whether a ... legal instrument is ambiguous presents a legal question, over which this
court exercises free review." Chubbuckv. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198,201, 899
P.2d 411, 414 (1995); Union Pac. R.R. Co., at 437-38, 50 P.3d at 452-53 . "An
instrument which is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation is ambiguous."
Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983). "The legal
effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a
question of law." Id. at 857, 673 P.2d at 1051. "If, however, the instrument of
conveyance is ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for the
trier of fact." Id.

Mountainview Landowners Coop. Assoc., Inc., v. Cool , 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486
(2004).
Under Massachusetts law, there are three sets of circumstances which may give rise to a right
of indemnification: an express agreement to indemnify, an implied contractual right of
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indemnification or a tort-based right based on a great disparity in the fault of the parties. Araujo v.

Woods Hole et.al., 693 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982). An implied contractual right of indemnification
will be found where there is a "special relationship" between the parties or when there are "unique
special factors" demonstrating that the parties intended the would-be indemnitor to bear the ultimate
liability. See Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 479 N.E.2d 1386, 1391 (1985).
The district court interpreted the MOU to create a right of indemnification. (R. Vol. VI, p.
1228). Pursuant to Paragraph 2.c. of the MOU, the Lockwood Entities agreed to use their best
efforts to obtain the release of the Golds from the Joans described therein (including specifically the
EIEDC loan) and Vreeken agreed that he would be personally obligated on such loans in order to
obtain the release of the Golds from such loans. Paragraph 2.c. of the MOU states as follows:
The Lockwood Entities will use their best efforts to effectthe release of: (I) [T. Gold]
and [R. Gold] from certain personal guarantees they have made with regard to the
following loans and (ii) certain securities pledged by [R. Gold] which is being held
as collateral for the Citizen's Loan, as defined below. If necessary to effect such
releases, Vreeken agrees to personally guarantee such loans. If the Lockwood
Entities fail to provide such release by the earlier of: (w) three (3) months after all
audited financials for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 are completed or (x) March 1, 2001,
then [T. Gold] and [R. Gold] shall have the option of terminating this Agreement as
provided in Section 11 hereof, unless Vreeken shall expressly opt to indemnify [T.
Gold] and [R. Gold] from any damages they may incur as a result of such personal
guarantees. Until the earlier to occur of: (y) the releases pursuant to this Section 2(c)
are effected or (z) this Agreement is terminated as provided herein, any damage [T.
Gold] and [R. Gold] may incur as a result of such personal guarantees not being
released shall be secured by the assets of Lockwood Packaging and Lockwood
Packaging Idaho.

(R. Vol. V, p. 915; Trial Ex. 6, p. 4). The district court also noted that "Section 1(c) states that its
terms shall be inapplicable if' [T. Gold] and/or [R. Gold] are not being indemnified by Vreeken with
regard to their personal guarantees as specified in Section 2(c)."' (R. Vol. VI, p. 1228).
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Under the language of the MOU, the Golds specifically contracted to relinquish any interest
they had in the Lockwood Entities with the primary understanding that Vreeken and the Lockwood
Entities would relieve the Golds from liability on the Lockwood Entities' debts. All parties
understood that the Lockwood Entities' failure to obtain the release of the Golds from such
commitments could have resulted in liability on the part of the Golds. Therefore, the parties agreed
that Vreeken would execute personal guarantee(s) (and become personally liable for those
obligations) to ensure the Golds' release. As the district court stated in a prior ruling, "[i]mplied in
the agreement to use best efforts is the understanding that Vreeken agreed to personally guarantee
the loans, if such guarantee was necessary." (R. Vol. VI, p. 1130-31 ).
Vreeken agreed to become personally liable for these loans if necessary to obtain release of
the Golds. The comt correctly interpreted this undertaking (expressed in cursory fashion in what was
intended to be a preliminary document) to effectively constitute an agreement by Vreeken to
indemnify the Golds. Appellants have offered no real argument contrary to this interpretation.
Based on the intent and language of the MOU, the district court correctly found a right of
indemnification.

D.

The District Court Never Ruled on Any Alleged Motion to Amend to Conform to the
Pleadings and Any Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Was Barred by the MOU.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find a breach of fiduciary duty

because it never had an opportunity to rule on the issue. "It is well established that in order for an
issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an
assignment of error." Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. ofComr 's, 137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173,
1176 (2002). Issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not considered. Whitted, 121
Idaho at 122; 44 P.3d at 1177.
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"The determination whether an issue has been tried with consent of the parties is within the
trial court's discretion, and such determination will only be reversed when that discretion has been
abused." Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 226, 46 P.3d 518, 522 (2002). "Although I.R.C.P.
! 5(b) permits a court to base its decision on a theory fully tried by the parties, an issue not tried

either [by] express or implied consent cannot be the basis for the decision. The requirement that the
unpleaded issues be tried by at least the implied consent of the parties assures that the parties have
notice of the issues before the court and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and
argument." MK. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345,349,612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980).
"Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence
relevant to that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the parties
understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue." Id. (quoting MB! Motor Co., Inc. v.
Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6 th Cir. 1974)).
In a similar case, this Court rejected an argument that the actions of the appellants were
sufficient to amend to assert an unpleaded theory. In PFC, Inc. v. Rockland Telephone Co., the
plaintiff, before resting its case, "moved to amend its complaint to conform to the proof; however,
the motion did not seek to add the theory of account stated for the court's consideration. Finally,
PFC asked for no findings on account stated, and the district court made none." 121 Idaho 1036,
1039, 829 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1992). On appeal, this Court stated: "We will not decide a question
which was not presented and on which no ruling was obtained in the court below." Id.
There is no dispute that Appellants failed to plead a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (R.
Vol. III, p. 426-434). Noticeably absent from Appellants' argument regarding their alleged motion
to amend to conform to the evidence is actual evidence in the record that any such motion or the
24

issue of breach of fiduciary duty was ever presented to the district court for consideration.
Appellants alleged Motion consisted of nothing more than the following:
Mr. Manwaring:
The Court:

No other witnesses. Prior to resting, we'd simply make a
motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence presented.
Thank you. All right. That completes the evidentiary portion
of the trial. We're going to set up a briefing schedule for
closing argument.

(Tr. Vol. III, p. 143, In. 12-18). Based on this exchange, Appellants argue that the district court
granted their motion to assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (Amended Appellants' Brief,

p. 20). Appellants have pointed to no other evidence in the record to reflect that they sought a ruling
from the district court regarding a breach of fiduciary duty claim. As a result, the district court's
Order after the trial contains no findings of facts with regard to an alleged motion to amend or a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (R. Vol. 6, p. 1288-1310).
The evidence cited by Appellants also does not indicate that the fiduciary breach issue was
expressly or impliedly tried to the court. In fact, the Golds' objected to the testimony. (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 69- 70). Appellants claim that the transcript demonstrates in Volume III, pages 134, 138, and 141
that T. Gold breached his fiduciary duty to Vreeken, causing him $2,000,000 in actual damages and
the Joss of critical security interests. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 20). A close review of the
transcript identified by Appellant clearly evidences that there is no support for their argument.
Finally, the district court's prior ruling that the parties' release in the MOU prohibited any
claims other than fraud/misrepresentation bars Appellants' claim. (R. Vol. V, p. 1096-97). All of
the alleged evidence of breach of fiduciary duty is based on conduct prior to the execution of the
MOU. The parties to the MOU released all claims pertaining to such alleged conduct. (Trial Ex.
6, p. 3). Consequently, the district court did not en.
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E.

The District Court Never Ruled Whether Vreeken Had to Be Subpoenaed in His Native
Language Because Appellants Never Raised the Issue and Have Long Been Barred
From so Doing.

Appellants' claim that there was error in the manner in which Vreeken was subpoenaed is
barred for several reasons. First, Appellants may not raise the matter of personal jurisdiction on
appeal because there is no adverse ruling by the district court on the issue. "To raise an issue on
appeal, the record must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis for assignment oferror and this
Court will not consider orreview an issue raised for the first time on appeal." Magnuson Properties
Partnership v. City ofCoeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002) (citing Whitted v. Canyon
County Bd. ofCom'rs, 137 ldaho 118, 121-22, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176-77 (2002)) (emphasis added).

Because the district court never ruled on the issue of personal jurisdiction, there is no adverse ruling
in the record to form the basis for assignment of error. 5
Second, the issue was not raised in Appellant's first responsive pleading. (R. Vol. III, p. 426434). Although Appellants raised the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in their
answer, Appellants are not arguing lack of personal jurisdiction, but rather insufficiency of process,
a separate affirmative defense. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 17). Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure I 2(b), "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for reliefin any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto
if one is required .... " (emphasis added). Further, "[aJ defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived unless it is made
by motion prior to filing a responsive pleading and prior to filing any other motion .... " I.R.C.P.
5

Due to the fact that personal jurisdiction cannot now be raised, whether or not the process
served on Vreeken in Holland complied with the service of process requirements of the Hague
Convention need not be addressed.
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12(g)(l). Appellants did not raise the issue of insufficiency of process by motion prior to their first
responsive pleading, or even in their first responsive pleading, and therefore waived their right to
challenge sufficiency of process. (R. Vol. III, p. 426-434).
Third, assuming arguendo that Appellants' challenge to sufficiency of process is deemed to
fall under the umbrella of personal jurisdiction, Appellants are barred from raising the issue of lack
of personal jurisdiction on appeal because the defense was waived by submission. Raising lack of
personal jurisdiction in an answer without further action constitutes a waiver. See Moore's Federal
Practice 3d, § 12.31 [3]. In Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, the Court found that the defendant waived any

claims oflack of personal jurisdiction, even though the defense was mentioned in the answer, when
the defendant participated in extensive pretrial proceedings and passed up many opportunities to
move to dismiss during the four-year course oflitigation. 197 F.3d 58, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added); see also Continental Bank, NA. v. Meyer, IO F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7 th Cir. 1993) (finding that
although the defendant complied technically with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(l), he actively proceeded
with defense, waiving his right to objection to personal jurisdiction); Wyrough & Loser v. Pelmor
Labs, Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 547 (3d Cir. 1967) (same). In the case at hand, despite the fact that

Appellants raised the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction in their answer, thereby technically
complying with the requirements ofI.R.C.P. I 2(g), Appellants fully participated in their defense and
failed to move to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds during the multi-year course oflitigation.
Further, Appellants asserted counterclaims and cross-claims with their answer. (R. Vol. III, p. 426434). This active participation in the litigation and failure to move to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of the defense. Appellants may not now raise the issue on appeal.
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F.

Appellants Never Raised the Issue of Needing a Dutch Interpreter for Vreeken's
Deposition and the District Court Was Never Given an Opportunity to Rule.
Appellants cannot argue error when the district court was completely unaware of the issue

and never "denied" Vreeken an interpreter. Nothing in the record suggests that Vreeken ever
requested an interpreter for his deposition or raised the issue before the district court. In fact, the
Golds moved for summary judgment, relying in part on portions ofVreeken's deposition. (R. Vol.
IV, p. 824-38). Appellants made no objection or claim that Vreeken did not adequately understand
English. As noted previously, "[t]o raise an issue on appeal, the record must contain an adverse
ruling to form the basis for assignment of error and this Court will not consider or review an issue
raised for the first time on appeal." Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City o,fCoeur D'Alene, 138
Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002) (citing Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. of Com'rs, 137 Idaho 118,
121-22, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176-77 (2002)). Because Appellants did not raise the interpreter issue
previously, Appellants are now barred from raising the issue for the first time on appeal.
In addition, I.C.A.R. 52(a) was not intended to protect a party represented by counsel and
who could have requested an interpreter if needed. Although Vreeken cites to I.R.C.P. 42(b)(2),
I.R.C.P. 43(b)(2) addresses requests for an interpreter. Rule 43(b)(2) states: "If any party, or persons
the party intends to call as a witness, needs an interpreter as provided in Idaho Court Administrative
Rule 52, the party shall so notify the court at least fourteen (14) days before commencement

of the court proceedings . ... " I.R.C.P. 43(b)(2) (emphasis added). Vreeken could have made a
motion for a court appointed interpreter for his deposition, but he did not. If the court were to find
error in this circumstance, it would expose the Idaho court system to an unprecedented burden both
in civil and criminal cases where non-native English speakers were involved.
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More important, Vreeken did not need an interpreter. Vreeken's testimony during his
depositions and trial indicate that he was able to adequately communicate with his attorney, he
understood the questions asked of him in English, and he understood the proceedings. Moreover,
his comprehension is iJlustrated through his coherent, detailed answers in English. (R. Vol. I, p. 159161; R. Vol. IV, p. 824-838; R. Vol. III,p. 497-503; R. Vol. IV, p. 736-745). Vreeken can obviously
communicate well in English because he communicated with his employees in English. (Tr. Vol. I,
p. 105-106). Further still, a review of the relevant deposition testimony reveals that Vreeken
confirmed his non-reliance on any alleged representations by T. Gold, even after a brief recess and
opportunity to consult with his counsel on the subject. (R. Vol. IV, p. 828-30). Therefore, Vreeken
was neither entitled to an interpreter at his deposition, nor did the district court err by unknowingly
failing to provide one.

G.

The District Court's Findings That Vreeken Engaged in Wrongful Conduct Is
Supported by Substantial, Competent Evidence.
Appellants ignore the overwhelming evidence supporting the district court's findings of fact

regarding Vreeken's misconduct. As the Appellants' acknowledge, the district court's findings of
fact will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. l.R.C.P. 52(a). At trial, two issues remained:

"(l) whether Vreeken, by reason of his actions, opened the door to personal liability on the Payout
Notes provided for in the MOU, and (2) whether the location of Vreeken's alleged misconduct
occuITed within Massachusetts to an extent required to trigger the operation of Massachusetts
General Law ("MGL") Ch. 93 A." (R. Vol. VI, p. 1295).

6

Consequently, the primary evidence

during the three-day trial revolved around Vreeken's actions concerning the Golds' rights and

6

The district court found against Respondents on this second issue, and Respondents have not
appealed this finding.
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expectations arising from the MOU. The district court found, after hearing all the evidence, that
Vreeken had engaged in acts to circumvent and interfere with the Golds' bargained-for consideration
under the MOU, subjecting him to personal liability. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1300-04).
Appellants contest two of the district court's findings of fact. (Amended Appellants' Brief,
p. 24). First, Appellants claim that the district court erred in finding that Vreeken knowingly filed
UCC financing statements in the assets of LPC and LPCI with a priority over any liens on those
assets by the Golds. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 24). Appellants assert the finding is in error
because Vreeken testified he did not know what UCC security interests were or how they operated,
and the filings were performed by his legal counsel. 7
Second, Appellants argue that the district court erred in finding Christianne 's purchase of the
Bank of Idaho's interest manipulated by Vreeken because Appellants claim Christianne' s payment
to the Bank of Idaho was an "arms-length" transaction. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 24).
Essentially, Appellants are asking this Court to make new determinations regarding credibility, alter
the weight given to certain testimony, and revise the district court's findings of fact. "Findings based
on substantial, although conflicting, evidence will not warrant reversal." Mountainview Landowners
Coop. Assoc., Inc. v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (2004).
In this case, there is substantial, competent evidence to support the district court's findings
of fact. Vreeken acknowledged in his testimony that he executed the Vreeken UCC's and sent them
to his legal counsel in Massachusetts for filing. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 53-55). The Vreeken UCC's show
on their face that they were returned to Massachusetts after filing in Idaho. (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B;
7

Although irrelevant to the argument, Vreeken claims that T. Gold fraudulently filed a UCC lien
against LPI's assets. There is no evidence in the record to support Appellants' allegation. (R. Vol. I, p.
225-26; Trial Ex. 9).
30

Tr. Vol. II, p. 51-52). Vreeken did not testify that he failed to understand what a security interest is
or how it operates. The limited testimony indicates he did not know what the acronym UCC meant.
(R. Vol. III, p. 47-48, 117-18). The Vreeken UCC's gave public notice that Gerbroeders and LEBV
were claiming "[a] continuing security interest in all accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles,
documents of title, instruments, investment property, inventory, machinery, equipment, fixtures and
other goods" ofLPCI and LPC. (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B). Vreeken further testified attrial that, even
having acknowledged the absence of security agreements supporting the Vreeken UCC's, he was
upset because someone had forgotten to continue these financing statements. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 135-36).
He indicated a strong preference that the Vreeken UCC's still be in full force and effect, again despite
the absence of any security agreement to support them. Thus, whether Vreeken understood the
import of these UCC's when they were filed, he certainly came to understand their import and his
lack of right to maintain those filings during the six-year course of this litigation. In spite of these
understandings, Vreeken contumaciously maintained his position and desire that these filings remain
in place, to the prejudice of Respondents' rights and interest, even at trial. Further, as testified by T.
Gold, and as ruled by the Court in its prior decisions and orders, the MOU provides that the Golds'
security interests were only to be subordinate to current bank loans, all security positions on record
and any future refinancing of such bank loans as of the date of the MOU. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 3; Tr. Vol.
II, p. 15-18). Appellants have identified no evidence that the interests allegedly evidenced by the
Vreeken UCC's were of record as of the date of the MOU, or that there was ever any intention that
the Golds' security interests were to be subordinate to these alleged interests.
The effect of the filing of the Vreeken UCC's prior to the Golds' was a representation to the
world at large that LEBV and Gerbroeders had an all-assets lien on the assets of LPC and LPCI,
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superior in priority to that of the Golds. T. Gold in his testimony referred to the intent and obligation
of the parties under the MOU to create in the Golds' favor a perfected priority security interest in all
of the assets ofLPC, subordinate only to those liens specifically enumerated. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21-31).
The liens of the Vreeken entities were not among those enumerated liens. T. Gold testified that, as
a result of the intervening purported liens of the Vreeken entities on the Golds' collateral, the Golds
could not properly proceed against that collateral, because they could not offer clean title to a
prospective buyer at public or private sale. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 24-25).
T. Gold also testified pertaining to the various remedies and options which would have been
available to the Golds had they been able to proceed against their collateral. He testified that a prior
perfected security interest in the assets of LPCI and LPC, when coupled with a security interest in
LPCI's stock, would have been a powerful tool to recover amounts due under the Payout Notes. (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 24-26). Instead, the Golds. could not foreclose on any of their collateral with any
expectation of realizing any value because Vreeken filed the Vreeken UCC's, giving public notice
of an alleged security interest in all of the assets of LPC aud LPCI which had priority senior to the
security interests of Golds. Due to this intervening claim, the Golds were not able to offer clean title
to third parties, and the Golds' access to and the value of their collateral was thereby grossly
impaired. Further, the Golds never were able to perfect their security interest in the LPCistock,
because the stock was never properly delivered out of the control of Vreeken. The district court had
ample evidence to find that Vreeken's acts in interfering with the Golds' security interests provided
in the MOU breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
As testified by T. Gold at trial, during the course of this six-year litigation, the value of the
Golds' collateral diminished from millions of dollars (more than enough to secure obligations owing
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to the Golds under the MOU) to nothing at the time of trial, LPCI having then gone out of business.
At the time of trial, LPCI had no accounts receivable and virtually no inventory. The value of
machinery and equipment was reduced to almost nothing. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 26-35).
Likewise, substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Vreeken
orchestrated through Christianne payment to Bank ofldaho of the balance due on the Bank ofidaho
loan and assignment of the Bank ofidaho Loan to Christianne to thwart the Golds' rights under the
MOU. Melanie Harris, the bookkeeper for LPCI, described the facts and circumstances surrounding
the payment of the Bank of Idaho debt. (Trial Ex. 1 and 2; Tr. Vol. I, p. 21-27). Melanie Harris
stated that she had direct discussions with Vreeken pertaining to the wire transfer of the funds to
LPCI and she received instructions from Vreeken on the usage of the funds to satisfy the amount due
to Bank ofldaho on the Bank ofidaho debt. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 21-27). Melanie Harris further testified
in detail about how the assets of LPCI were transferred from LPCI to Telford (Christianne's
company) as payment by LPCI on the Bank of Idaho loan acquired by Christianne and assigned by
her to Telford. By transferring all of the assets to Telford, the Golds' security interests were
additionally significantly impaired.
Melanie Harris clearly testified to the following regarding the transfer of assets from LPCI
to Telford: (i) the transfer of the assets was in payment of amounts due on the Bank ofidaho loan,
(ii) any outstanding obligations due by LPCI to LEBV or Gerbroeders were not reduced in anyway
on the books of LPCI as a result of the transfer, (iii) the assets which were transferred constituted
virtually all of the capital assets with value ofLPCI and as a result of the transfer the value of capital
assets on the LPCI balance sheet was reduced to zero, (iv) all of the assets which were transferred
as shown on Trial Exhibit 3 were shown on the books and records ofLPCI as assets owned by LPCI
33

and (v) as a result of the transfer the amount due on the Bank ofldaho debt was reduced on the books
ofLPCI. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 34-40). Melanie further stated that her discussions involving Telford on the
asset transfer and pertaining to the ongoing business operations ofTelford were always with Vreeken
and not with Christianne. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 40). Loma Schuebert's testimony also verified that the asset
transfer was conducted in the manner described by Melanie Harris. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 99-120).
Further, Christianne admitted to T. Gold when she "purchased" the Bank ofldaho debt, she
was just doing what she was told to do by her father and that she did not want any part of the
transaction. Christianne told T. Gold that she had no idea as to the nature of the transaction when
she signed the papers, other than it was being done in an effort to get the Golds to take less than they
were entitled to under the MOU, or for her father to be able to pursue the guarantee ofT. Gold (now
purportedly owned by Christianne) of the Bank of Idaho obligation. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 46-49).
Christianne' s failure to appear and protect any interest she might have further confirms that Vreeken
manipulated the transaction. As the district court noted, "Vreeken's actions, taken together, show
an overarching plan to divest the Golds of their entitlements under the MOU. His conduct, more
than simply showing a lack of good faith, manifests bad faith." (R. Vol. VI, p. 1306). The district
court had substantial, competent evidence to support its findings ofVreeken's wrongful conduct.

H.

The District Court Never Determined That the Assignment from the Bank of Idaho to
Christianne Was Void.
The district court did not determine that the assignment from the Bank of Idaho to

Christianne Vreeken was void. Appellants do not cite the record to assert their position because
there was no such finding made. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1296-97). "To raise an issue on appeal, the record

must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis for assignment of error and this Court will not
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consider or review an issue raised for the first time on appeal." Magnuson Properties Partnership
v City a/Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002) (citing Whittedv. Canyon County Bd.

o/Com'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121-22, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176-77 (2002))(emphasis added).
Further, the issue is irrelevant. The district court did not need to find the assignment void
in order to determine that Vreeken breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As
set forth previously, the district court found that Vreeken manipulated the transaction through his
daughter and her dummy corporation, Telford, to impair the Golds' rights and interests pursuant to
the MOU. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1296-97). Whether the assignment between Christianne Vreeken and the
Bank ofidaho is void or not has no bearing on the liability created by Vreeken' s wrongful conduct.
Further, the district court made no such finding, and therefore, committed no error.
Further, Appellants have no standing to raise a claim belonging to Christianne. She has not
proffered an appeal in this matter, and is now barred from so doing. Further, the district court ruled
that the Bank ofrdaho debt was satisfied. (R. Vol. IV, p. 769). This finding has not been appealed
by Christianne or Appellants, and both are now barred from so doing. The district court did not err.

I.

The District Court Properly Admitted Evidence Through the Testimony of T. Gold
Based upon a Finding That Christianne Was Vreeken's Agent and the Statement Was
an Admission of a Party Opponent. 8
Although hearsay is generally not admissible, statements which would normally be

considered hearsay may be admissible on the basis that 1) they are, in fact, classified as non-hearsay
or 2) they are subject to one of the hearsay exceptions. During trial, T. Gold was allowed to testify
to a conversation he had with Christiam1e. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 46-49). The district court correctly

8

Appellants incorrectly assert the district court allowed the testimony as a statement of a coconspirator, which the record does not support. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 47-48).
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admitted this evidence as non-hearsay under I.RE. 801 (d)(2), as an admission of a party opponent.
Specifically, the court determined that the statements fell under subsection (D) of 801(d)(2), "a
statement by a party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of agency or
employment of the servant or agent, made during the existence of the relationship." (Tr. Vol. II, p.
47-48). Concerning the foundational evidence required for admission of evidence under LR.E.
801(d)(2)(D), the Idaho Court of Appeals has established that "independent evidence of the agency
relationship, i.e., evidence apart from the alleged agent's own statements, are necessary before the
alleged agent's out-of-court declarations maybe admitted." R Homes Corp. v. Herr, 142 Idaho 87,
92, 123 P.3d 720, 725 (Ct. App. 2005)(citingHayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952)).
"Agency" is a relationship resulting from "the manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Herbst
v. BothofDairies, Inc., I IO Idaho 971,973, 719 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Ct. App. 1986) (citingRestatement

(Second) Agency§ 1, at 7 (1958)). Early on in the case, it was established through the testimony of
Vreeken that Christialllle helped her father manage the Lockwood companies, thereby acting as his
agent in the day-to-day function of the companies. (R. Vol. III, p. 499). Further, Vreeken asked
Christialllle to use the money he gave her to pay off the Bank of Idaho loan. (R. Vol. III, p. 499).
Therefore, Christianne was acting as an agent at the time of the transfer, and her comments to T.
Gold concerning the transfer are admissible as a statement by a party's agent under I.RE.
801(d)(2)(D).
Additionally, T. Gold's testimony is also admissible because it qualifies as hearsay subject
to an exception under the "declarant unavailability" exception of I.RE. 804. Under Rule 804, a
declarant is considered unavailable when she, "persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject
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matter of declarant's statement despite a court order to do so" (I.R.E. 804(a)(2)), or when she, "is
absent from the hearing and the proponent of declarant' s statement have been unable to procure
declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means." (l.R.E. 804(a)(5)). Prior to trial, the
Golds made every attempt to obtain Christianne' s testimony, scheduling her deposition five different
times (August 5, 2003, November 14, 2003, April 5, 2004, September 8, 2004, and September 28,
2004). On May 3, 2004, the court ordered her to personally appear for the taking of her deposition
and Christianne still failed to appear. (R. Vol. IV, p. 765). The court ultimately dismissed
Christianne's claims because of her chronic failure to appear and comply with the court order. (R.
Vol. IV, p. 761-770). Due to Christianne's failure to cooperate with the Golds and the court order,
the Golds were unable to procure her attendance through court order or other means. Therefore,
Christianne was an "unavailable witness" for the purposes ofl.R.E. 804(a)(2) and 804(a)(5).
Since Christianne was an "unavailable witness," her statements to T. Gold qualify under the
hearsay exception of I.R.E. 804(b)(3), a statement against interest. As per l.R.E. 804(b)(3), a
statement against interest is "[a] statement which was at the time of making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability ... that a reasonable man in declarant' s position would not have made the
statement unless declarant believed it to be true." In this case, Christianne' s statements against her
interest were clear from T. Gold's testimony during his direct examination, possibly establishing her
own liability. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 48). Therefore, Christianne's statements to T. Gold are statements by
an unavailable witness against her own interests and are admissible as such under I.R.E. 804(b)(3).
In the alternative, if it is found that the admission of evidence concerning T. Gold's
conversation with Christianne was made in error, the error was harmless. Error is disregarded as
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harmless unless the ruling affects a substantial right of the party. See Herman ex rel. Herman v.

Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 784, 41 P.3d 209,212 (2002); see also I.R.C.P. 61 andI.R.E. 103(a). In
this case, the admission of T. Gold's testimony concerning his telephone conversation with
Christianne did not affect any of the Appellants' substantial rights. Despite the fact that the evidence
was admitted, the Appellants were still able to conduct a thorough cross-examination of T. Gold.
Further, Appellants presented evidence in the form ofVreeken's testimony concerning T. Gold's
conversation with Christianne. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 92). In addition, the district court had other
substantial, competent evidence upon which to make its findings. Vreeken's manipulation of the
Bauk of Idaho loan and transfer of assets to Telford was supported by other testimony and
documentary evidence. (See Section G, discussing Vreeken's wrongful conduct). Consequently,
even if the district court erred, the district court's findings were supported and corroborated by other
substantial evidence.

J.

The District Court Correctly Refused to Allow Appellants to Introduce Certain
Documentary Evidence, and Appellants Never Sought to Use Jack Schipper as a
Witness at Trial.
First and foremost, Appellants never included Jack Schipper as a witness in their pretrial

submission. Mr. Schipper was never mentioned as a witness in either of Appellants' witness and
exhibit lists (R. Vol. VI, p.1266 and 1269), and was not raised when the Golds' Motion to Exclude
Testimony and Exhibits was argued. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 8-14). On appeal, the record must contain an
adverse ruling to form the basis for assignment of error. Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City

of Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002). Appellants never submitted Jack Schipper
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as a witness and never raised the issue as to whether his testimony should be allowed. Consequently,
there is no adverse ruling on the record and the issue cannot be appealed. 9
Concerning the district court's exclusion of certain documentary evidence, 10 challenges to
a trial court's evidentiary rnlings are examined under the abuse of discretion standard. See Kozlowski

v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825,827, 828 P.2d 854, 856 (1992). When considering whether the trial court
abused its discretion, the Court considers whether the court correctly perceived the issue as
discretionary, whether the court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards, and whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. See

Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr, 134 Idaho 46,995 P.2d 816 (2000) (citing Lamar Corp. v.
City ofTwin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999)). However, error is disregarded
as harmless unless the ruling affects a substantial right of the party. Herman, 136 Idaho at 784, 41
P.3d at 212.
The district court correctly considered that the decision to admit or exclude the documentary
evidence in question was discretionary.

I.R.E. 104(a), in pertinent part, states, "Preliminary

questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... " (emphasis added). Therefore,
the court correctly perceived its choice to admit or exclude the evidence as discretionary.

9

To the extent Appellants are confusing Jack Schipper with either Hans Van Der Sande or
William Windells, the witnesses added to the witness list of March 28, 2007 (R. Vol. VI, p. 1269) no
prejndice conld have resulted. The district court allowed both Hans Van Der Sande and William
Windells to testify. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 12-14).
10

Exhibits 4-21 of Defendant's Witness and Exhibit List of March 28, 2007. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 13-

14).
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The district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the
applicable legal standards. The district court denied the admission of the documentary evidence on
the grounds of late disclosure. (Tr. Vol. I, p.13-14). A trial court may impose sanctions for failure
to obey a scheduling or pre-trial order upon motion or its own initiative. See McKim v. Horner, 143
Idaho 568, 572, 149 P.3d 843,847 (2006). Therefore, the exclusion of the documentary exhibits is
well within the boundaries of the trial court's discretion. The court's authority "is discretionary and
sanctions may include barring evidence from being introduced, dismissing an action, and assessing
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees." Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687,690,809 P.2d 1166,
1169 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added).
In this case, Appellants disclosed the documentary evidence well after the discovery deadline,
which the court had set no later than fourteen (14) days before trial for each party's list of proposed
exhibits and no later than seven (7) days before trial for the deposit of exhibits. (R. Vol. VI, p.
1147).

Further, in the Order, the court stated that "No exhibits shall be admitted into evidence at

trial other than those disclosed, listed and submitted to the clerk of the court in accordance with this
order, except when offered for impeachment purposes or unless they were discovered after the last
required disclosure." (R. Vol. VI, p. 1147-48). Appellants submitted their amended witness and
exhibit list on March 28, 2007, a mere five days before trial, thereby violating the Order, and
Appellants made no showing of good cause as to why the exhibits should be admitted despite the
time line set in the Order. More important, Appellants acknowledged that the exhibits had not
previously been disclosed in response to discovery requests, even though Appellants were aware of
their existence. Appellants argue as their excuse for late disclosure not that they were unaware of
the documents, but merely that they did not think they were important. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10-12). As the
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district comi judge noted, "This case has been pending nearly six years. There has been plenty of
opportunity to dig out this material and get it submitted timely in discovery and have it be part of the
ongoing case. It's simply not excusable to have that revealed the week before trial and included in
a late filed exhibit list without being disclosed as part of the normal discovery procedure." (Tr. Vol.
I, p. 14).
Finally, the district court reached its decision by exercise of reason. The district court
provided valid, legally acceptable reasoning behind its decision to exclude the documentary evidence
- failure to timely disclose. Such basis for exclusion may be used at the court's discretion.
Therefore, based upon the foregoing factors, the district court did not abuse its discretion concerning
the exclusion of the exhibits in question.
In the alternative, if it is found that the district court did exclude the exhibits in error due to
an abuse of discretion, the error was harmless and therefore should be disregarded. As noted above,
error is considered harmless unless a substantial right of the party in question has been affected.

Herman, !36 Idaho at 784, 41 P.3d at 212. See also I.R.C.P. 61 andI.R.E. l03(a). The exclusion
of the documents did not affect any of the Appellants' substantial rights. The Appellants were still
able to put on witnesses to testify to their knowledge and the nature of the contributions made by
Lockwood Holding to LPI and other various agreements made between LEBV and LPL Therefore,
the district court's error, if any, was harmless.

K.

The District Court Correctly Determined That Certain Assets were Owned by LPCI
as Capitai Contributions from Vreeken to LPCI.
Appellants presented no credible evidence that equipment provided by Vreeken to LPCI was

provided as loans or leases. The district court carefully set forth the evidence it relied on to
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determine that the funds to purchase various assets or equipment provided to LPCI were capital
contributions by Vreeken as follows:
The Court deems it necessary to explain the finding that the assets were the property
ofLPCI and not Vreeken. During the course of the trial, evidence was offered that
many of the big-ticket assets used by LPCI were paid for by Vreeken (by him or
through his many corporations). Defendants assert that these assets were capital
contributions, while Plaintiff argues the assets were the property ofVreeken and were
on lease to LPCI. Based on the evidence offered at trial, the Court finds that these
assets were contributions of capital and were not the property of Vreeken.
There is no disagreement that LPCI used the assets purchased by Vreeken in its
normal business operations. There is some limited dispute concerning the
significance of the assets being listed on LPCI's books. Vreeken argues that the
bookkeeping practices before 200 I, when Melanie Harris began employment, were
poor and did not properly account LPCI' s operations. The Golds argue that the assets
were listed as the property of LPCI in its sale of those assets to Telford. However,
LPCI sold the assets to Telford, thereby acting as the owner, settling that dispute ....
Given the evidence on record, the Court finds that the assets listed on Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 3 were the property of LPCI in the form of capital contributions from
Vreeken.
(R. Vol. VI, p. 1297-98; Trial Ex. 3).
Appellants contest the findings of the district court by pointing to conclusory testimony from
Vreeken that he did not "intend" any of the relevant equipment to be assets ofLPCI. (Amended
Appellants' Brief, p. 32). At best, Vreeken has presented an insignificant amount of conflicting
testimony, which is insufficient to establish clear error. See Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322,
325, 78 P.3d 389, 392 (2003)
The record before this Court also reveals the flaws in Vreeken's argument. Wiiiiam Windels
testified that all machinery and equipment present at LPCI belonged to LPCI. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 333334). Melanie Harris and Lorna Shuebert also testified that the assets had belonged to LPCI prior
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to the asset transfer to Telford. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 30-34, p. 111-119). This position is further supported
by: (a) T. Gold's testimony that LPCI had substantial equipment assets in the financial statements
he reviewed (Tr. Vol. II, p. 26-29), (b) the documentation transferring assets from LPCI to Telford
(Trial Ex. 3), (c) the UCC Financing Statements describing equipment ofLPCI which were fiied in
Idaho by EIEDC (Trial Ex. 8), and (d) the UCC Financing Statements describing specific equipment
ofLPCI and LPC filed in Idaho by Vreeken himself (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B; Tr. Vol. II, p. 26-29).
Appellants have not identified any evidence in the record to support their position that the assets in
question were not owned by LPCI. The district court's decision is not in error.

L.

Appellants Are Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees or Costs on Appeal.
The Golds do not dispute that this action is a commercial transaction and that the prevailing

party is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). Because Appellants have not
demonstrated any error oflaw or fact by the district court, they are not entitled to attorneys' fees or
costs on appeal.

VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Appeal be dismissed and
that Respondents be granted their attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of July, 2008.

DeAnne Caspers<m
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
Counsel for Respondents
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